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which remains shallow, heavily exploitative, 
and likely disastrous, not only for many 
other species but for many hwnans as well-­
but uneasy also with main deeper enviromnen­
tal approaches, rrost of which now emanate 
from North America. Elsewhere I have, to my 
cost, taken issue with Deep Ecology, a rrove­
ment with European origins quickly captured 
in california, but here I wish to criticize 
fonns of Moral Extensionism that now have a 
main base in the southern U.S.A., fonns that 
elaborate rroral standing, considerability, 
and rights theories. Again the criticism 
will not be purely negative~ positive alter­
native positions will begin to emerge in 
early rrorning outline. 
M::lral extensionisms extend rrorality and 
conventional chauvinistic rroral apparatus 
beyond its conventional (but certainly unwar­
ranted) confines to certain subjects and 
areas where it has not been applied, or blse, 
rrore likely, has been used for discrimination 
and other negative purposes. They simply 
extend the rroral apparatus without much in 
the way of adjustment, with egalitarian as­
sumptions (equal value, equal rights, equal 
consideration, etc.) applied to a wider class 
of "rroral" subjects. Moral extensionism is a 
typical and useful weapon of liberation and 
rights rrovements (though such rrovements could 
proceed with rrore accurate but less publicly 
impressive equipment. As seen by a. conserva­
tive opposition, rroral extensionisms endeavor 
to bend morality to certain illegitimate 
purposes, since not only do the extensions 
make nonsense of the notions involved 
(rights, equality, standing, interests, 
etc.), but in any case everything is suffi­
ciently in order, at least on the boundaries, 
as it isl Seen from a wider environmental 
perspective, extensionisms are not always 
unjustified in where they go but in how they 
go, in the pseudo-egalitarian facades of the 
extensions, and rrore important in where they 
stop. For though privilege is widened and so 
diluted, it remains. The zones of extension 
remain too limited, and things outside the 
usual extensions, such as forests, species, 
ecosystems, continue to be open to substan­
tial mistreatment, exploitation, and so on. 
Nor can the sorts of things involved plausib­
ly be brought within the extension fold 
(though isolated efforts are not lacking), 
for they appear to lack requisite character­
istics on which extensions operate, such as 
sentience, pain receptivity, interests, indi­
viduality, or whatever. f'or example, the 
very idea of an envirorunental ethic, which 
serves to protect uninhabited envirorunents 
and to justify requisite respect for natural 
systems and communities, founders on the 
rroral rights position propounded by Regan in 
defence of certain animals. 
Morality is a many purpose weapon, often 
deployed by pressure and interest groups. 
Throughout rrodern history it has typically 
been used to ground and justify a wide range 
of activity and practices hostile to natural 
environments. Hwnans are entitled to this or 
that; their needs generate these or those 
requirements, which ought to be met even 
though there are costs to local envirorunents, 
and so forth. Those opposed to rrorality-­
there is a long and distinguished philosophi­
cal chain from Lao-tsu through Hinckfuss and 
Pigden--have a point when it comes to such 
rrorality. The damage of rroralities and rroral 
viewpoints often seems substantially higher 
than the benefits conferred. That is because 
the restrictions they impose are heavy, and 
often work the wrong ways. A sort of cost/ 
benefit assessment of rrorality thus gets 
under way, supposedly yielding negative re­
sults. 
Many are the arguments for morality, 
beginning with the claim that it is impossi­
ble to conduct oneself and one I s life without 
lapsing into moral talk, concepts, practices, 
and, generalizing, back into rrorality. Part 
of the response to such faulty arguments is 
always that there are distinctions, insisted 
upon by leading rroral theorists themselves, 
between value matters and rrorality. And 
there is a further distinction, tougher to 
maintain, between practical deontic expres­
sions (practical and expedient oughts and 
should, for instance) and rroral o~ With 
such devices,. anti--moralists, who do have a 
solid case against objective or absolute 
rroralities, can escape rroral hooks. 
Making rrorality work the right ways, 
where it does figure seriously, is uncomfor­
tably like making weapons work for peace 
(rrorality being a main force behind wars and 
preparation for wars) , rrore like than it 
ought to be. Nor is it nearly as easy as it 
was: beating swords into ploughshares, to 
provide an assault on the environment instead 
of other creatures, was a pretty easy techno-
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logical feat compared with converting an Fl­
11 fighter-bomber or a rrodern submarine to 
peaceful purposes (genuinely peaceful ones, 
that is; of course, like guns in the west, 
they I re peacemakers). For local chauvinism, 
in one form of another (hmnan, or more like­
ly, national, state, or race), is now deeply 
entrenched in most bureaucratic arrangements 
and an integral part of supporting social 
sciences and technology. Even so, whatever 
local practices, moral theory can be recti­
fied; the theorizing can be accomplished, 
even if a new morality is not spccessfully 
applied, and must await its post-Armeggedon 
day. Thus the protracted battle to duly ex­
pand morality goes on. 
There are two main battle-lines over 
which ideological wars (quaint to anti-moral­
ists) are fought as regards moral extension 
issues, lines purportedly marking moral outer 
bounds. Tlie first line concerns the follow­
ing cluster of (often equated) notions: mor­
al status, standing, consideration, rele­
vance, considerability, etc. The second line 
concentrates on a narrower group: moral 
permissions, rights, etc. These lines will 
be surveyed in turn. 
Against moral standing and 
simplistic moral typologies 
The notion of moral standing, introduced 
by questionable analogy with the Anglo-Amer.f.­
can notion of legal standing, is corning to 
play a major but damaging role in environmen­
tal ethics. It is damaging because, very 
brieflY, it would paint a heavy, but rather 
arbitrary, black/white boundary--segregating 
off those that have not fran those that have 
moral standing--across much more complex 
territory. 
As to its role, it is sometimes claimed 
that adoption and defense of a criterion of 
moral standing is "absolutely basic" in envi­
ronmental thinking and problem solving, "rea­
sonably addressing" the issue of moral stand­
ing "must be viewed as a benchmark of any 
plausible lenvironmental ethic. I" None of 
this is so evident, especially given the 
murkiness of the notion of moral standing. 
In the same vein, it is stated that "a neces­
sary condition for an adequate ethical theory 
is the most [!] defensible criterion of moral 
standing" [1] 
Such statements are surely overstate­
ments. For, in the first place, there can be 
and indeed appear to be ethics which count as 
environmental ones which do not include a 
notion of moral standing (e.g., Naessls deep 
ecology, Rodman I S ecological sensibility) • 
Second, elaborations of these theories can 
make warranted claims to adequacy, without 
introducing and perhaps explicitly rejecting 
(for the sorts of reasons given below) a 
notion of moral standing. 
An initial tactical point against tne 
notion of moral standing concerns its origin, 
on the rrodel of legal standing. Legal stand­
ing is a dubious rrodel for any sufficiently 
comprehensive notion of sometimes entering 
into moral consideration (which can be true 
of almost anything). For one reason, it 
imports some decidedly restrictive assump­
tions concerning interests and rights of 
whatever has such standing. But many things 
of value which enter into ethical assessment 
on occasions do not have and are not the 
sorts of things that can significantly have 
interests or hold rights. Legal standing 
always operates in terms of having certain 
sorts of interests which can be represented, 
whereas what has or deserves environmental 
standing may not have interests or be the 
sort of thing that could have interests even 
as derived (as in the case of legal persons, 
such as companies) from those of its members. 
More often indeed, to have legal standing is 
to have certain rights, duties, protection, 
etc., beginning with the right of being able 
to proceed to the courts. 
Of course, there is considerable room to 
widen the notion of legal standing (which can 
even exclude envirorunental organizations) and 
to admit, through representation, other 
"claimants" to the courts. Presently, the 
rrodel is much too narrow, restricting access 
to certain capitalist persons and claimants. 
But there are severe conceptual difficulties 
in the way of broadening the notion of stand­
ing to encompass many requisite environmental 
objects, because again of the limitations the 
notions of interests and rights impose. Or­
ganizations of persons, such as partnerships, 
coalitions, and so on, do not exceed (easy 
stretching at most of) these limits, since 
interests and rights accrue fran component 
members: uninhabited ecosystems, natural 
IlDnuments, and the like do exceed those lim­
its, c'Onsiderably. Only by a brazen and 
implausible overriding of these conceptual 
limitations (such as Stone is prepared to 
fancy American courts indulging in) can the 
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in-built severe internal restrictions of the 
legal model be overcome. 
still, the inadequacies of its legal 
analogy could be recognized, the analogy left 
behind, and a fresh unimpeded account of the 
now rather free-floating notion offered. 
VanDeVeer and Pierce are rash enough to pro-
pose an explication of !lOral standing which 
can be construed along these lines. Accord-
ing to them, "For any thing x, X has !lOral 
standing if and only if the continued exis-
tence of X or its interests in well-being 
have positive !lOral weight. "[2] Actually, 
they ~ that they're stipulating this, but 
they're not free simply to stipulate, given 
that it is a notion with some currency alrea-
dy, something they recognize in proceeding at 
once to consider various standard answers to 
their "basic question, Which things have 
!lOral standing?" The account proposed is 
!lOre than a little curious, not to say ob-
scure and scarcely grammatical. Later, they 
in effect substitute a less tortuous account, 
namely: "X has !lOral standing if and only if 
the (continued) existence or welfare of X has 
positive m:>ral weight."[3] Either way, the 
account is circular, since having positive 
!lOral weight and having !lOral standing are 
interdependent notions. In fact, some of the 
problems with the account could have been 
avoided by cutting out the troublesome middle 
part and !lOving on to the following simpler, 
explicitly circular account: X has !lOral 
standing if and only if X possesses (or ob-
tains) positive noral weight. But then as an 
explication the definition might almost as 
well drop outr it explicates nothing, con-
necting some near synonyms only. 
Perhaps it is better to ask: What work 
does the notion do? The trouble is that 
except on particular theories which legislate 
as to what has !lOral standing, the notion in 
fact does very little work in envirorunental 
ethics because there is little agreement 
about what determines it. It is one of those 
notions whose main home base lies within the 
confines of traditional chauvinistic ethics, 
which does not extend or travel well to the 
wider environmental setting. All the main 
criteria proposed for !lOral standing are 
unsatisfactory, they are not only unstable 
and rather arbitrary but tend to confuse 
ethical classifications with biological clas-
sifications (such as membership in the spe-
cies HOlOO sapiens or in the zoological king-
dam) or with sociopsychological distinctions 
(such as linguistic capacity or canpetence or 
potential personhood). 
Despite the enthusiasm shown for the 
notion of !lOral standing, then, no satisfac-
tory criterion for !lOral standing emerges or 
is in clear sight. It remains to be derron-
strated that there is a stable, non-arbitrary 
context-invariant notion of !lOral standing 
worth pursuing. The reason for the enthusi-
asm about this difficult notion that does no 
present useful work is evident enough: it 
would decisively delimit the !lOral search 
space, what needs to be looked at in !lOral 
conflict issues, utilitarian cost/benefit 
assessments, applications and delimitations 
of categorical imperatives (which presuppose 
a !lOral universe, usually of persons), and so 
forth. There are as well !lOre sinister ul-
terior purposes behind some proposed applica-
tions of the notion, for instance use of the 
distinction to reduce the search space 
towards the confines of the humanistic/chau-
vinistic fold (partly this is achieved by use 
of the tenn "!lOral"). Moral standing is not 
a m:>rally nelitral notion but a framework and 
culturally dependent one, hence some of its 
limitations. 
Consider instead of work, instead of 
straightforward pragmatics, what !lOral stand-
ing is supposed to confer or~. It is 
assumed that if X has !lOral standing, then 
!lOral agents have presumptive obligations and 
duties to x, e.g., to let it alone, not to 
confine it or undermine its interests. Or, 
to put it the other way around, if a thing 
has m:>ral standing, it is entitled to contin-
ued existence, pursuit of its interests, 
whereas if it lacks !lOral standing, it does 
not have this protection, it does not count, 
instead there is entitlement to interfere 
with it. Indeed, so it is said, "By defini-
tion of !lOral standing, if something lacks 
m:>ral standing, its well-being just does not 
itself !lOrally count. [4] The definition, 
however, delivers no such rJsult; further 
implausible assumptions (reduction of weight 
to well-being, equality conditions for count-
ing) from an underlying picture of !lOral 
assessment are implicitly incorporated (a 
utilitarian picture where items without !lOral 
standing are discounted and trade-offs of 
items with !lOral standing are soon contempla-
ted). 
Such application accordingly implies an 
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unfortunate all-or-nothing division: if an 
item is in,it gets (careful) consideration, 
otherwise it gets nothing--exactly what the 
legal analogy implies, a proper hearing if 
standing and otherwise nothing. What this 
black/white division should be contrasted 
with is not removal of all distinctions but 
rather a more sophisticated ethical typology 
based on a listing of ethically relevant 
features and capacities, such as having val-
ue, well-being, preferences, autonany, and so 
forth, and appropriate ethical postulates and 
principles that are- geared to these. 
That the all-or-nothing character of 
moral standing needs to be at least modified 
becanes evident from various distinctions 
soon introduced to keep it afloat, e.g., 
duties to (direct duties) as opposed to du-
ties regarding (indirect and perhaps deriva-
tive duties). The main strategy adopted in 
People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees to save 
the all-or-nothing context-independent boun-
dary consists in appeal to the specially-
adjusted notion of presumptive duties. Moral 
standing is assumed to be necessary and suf-
ficient for presumptive duties; specifically, 
moral agents "have a presumptive duty to X 
[to treat it morally decently] if and only if 
X has moral standing. But presumptive duties 
are even more prone to be upset by overriding 
circumstances than the older prima facie 
duties (which the notion expands) ; so the 
notion operates even more as a theory-saving 
device. But even as so hedged around and so 
extended (by derivative duties, duties re-
garding things without moral standing) , the 
connections forged are IlDlch too simple, as 
will appear. First, a more complex classifi-
cation of things is required for moral pur-
pose~ than a hard division into moral count-
abIes and others, a nonarbitrary classifica-
tion such as the above typology. Second, 
rights and duties, which the notion of moral 
standing is supposed to bound, link rather 
with value, and extent of value. 
Much of the importance ascribed to noral 
standing or moral consideration comes frcm 
conflating it with value consideration, which 
is in turn equated with having sane (non-
negligible) value, bearing value that would 
be taken into account, and perhaps counted, 
in any ccmplete value assessment. Though 
moral attributes are evidently a subclass of 
value attributes, the conflation is COlmOOIl-
place. Possessing intrinsic or inherent 
value is even offered sanetimes as an alter-
native to moral status, but more often the 
confusion is less blatant. Indeed, People, 
Penguins, and Plastic Trees,which begins by 
warning us about slipperiness, soon slides 
itself frcm noral standing to intrinsic value 
and before long has identified the noral 
standing of things with their being "valuable 
in themselves." However, these notions have 
different connotations. For example, being 
morally considerable suggests scme suitable 
noral dimension, some weight to be taken into 
account, not merely sane relevance. Consi-
deration also characteristically requires 
that the item in question has interests or at 
least a well-being or such like (a telos) 
that an agent can be considerate towards. A 
different notion would not impose these limi-
tations; e.g., those of awe, respect, etc., 
do not. Nor,· it would appear, does moral 
relevance, yet another different notion some-
times equated with moral standing, though 
prestmlably erroneously, since mere artifacts 
are morally relevant on occasions (for simi-
lar reasons, moral significance differs frcm 
standing) • Moral relevance remains an elu-
sive, context-dependent quarry that .has eva-
ded contemporary moral philosophers of high 
standing, despite much effort put into the 
chase. Since how'ever, these other notions 
are not going to be put to serious work--rrost 
of them are, like noral standing, better 
nothballed or scrapped--we can quietly bypass 
the nuances and differences. 
Certainly, moral consideration and val-
ue interconnect, with value the wider notion 
and morality, if not derivative, at least 
dependent. A nost important way in which 
they connect is through limitations on inter-
ference. Morality precludes the gross reduc-
tion of value. A little more precisely, a 
noral actor is not nonnally entitled to in-
terfere deliberately in such a way as to 
reduce significantly overall value (or risk 
the possibility of such reduction). But 
exact fornmlation of such noninterference 
principles is a sensitive .matter--mainly 
because deontic principles do not exclude 
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some reduction of value, provided it is suf-
ficiently limited--a matter to which we shall 
be obliged to retmn. 
By contrast with noral considerability, 
standing, and the like, value notions are 
fundamental, and not at all easily avoided, 
even by anti-moralists, in the regions of 
envirorunental ethics. Some of the analog 
notions are trivial, however,. e.g., a thing 
warrants value consideration if and only if 
it has value. Even so, the analog notions 
help in shifting the issues and showing wher:e 
the real problem lies with the group of rroral 
notions, namely in what makes something !!!?!:: 
ale It is this notion, too, that has induced 
the unwarranted narrowing of focus to chau-
vinistic concerns. For a cormnonplace answer, 
certainly wrong, to what determines what is 
noral is: human concerns. Rather, what is 
rroral has to do with interest-independent 
value and with a certain impartiality and 
lack of discriminations (i.e., in rrore old-
fashioned fonns, with justice and goodness), 
features reflected formally in suitable uni-
versalizability of principle. [5] So con-
ceived, rroral matters do not tenninate at 
certain narrower ethical types, which exclude 
the wider envirorunent. The width of concern 
would be better revealed by replacing "rroral" 
by its original equivalent "ethical" (for 
comparison, consider the effect in environ-
mental ethics of a reclassification as "envi-
ronmental rrorals" or "environmental rrorali-
ty"). 
Against envi romentally-restrictive 
rights packages 
Ethical standing does not strictly get 
or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an 
item .in an ethical door for a hearing; it may 
or may not be conceded or granted rights in 
the hearing. Rights imply some standing, but 
not vice ~; some standing is even, if you 
like, a proper part of a right. While such 
an equation is not much excuse for identify-
ing standing and rights, still too often the 
differences are glossed over: having rroral 
rights is equated with having rroral standing. 
Underneath these equations and conventions 
lie important assumptions; not just the rrore 
trivial one that what has a status thereby 
has a right, for instance to get in the 
ethical door, but the assumption that having 
rights and standing or consideration are 
rendered equivalent through a camtOI1 middle 
term, such as having interests, being capable 
of being represented, being able to benefit. 
For example, an item has rroral standing (or 
deserves noral consideration) if and only if 
it has (or can have) interests, i.e., if and 
only if it has (or can have) rights. If such 
faulty equations did hold, what has been said 
against rroral standing would apply also 
against rights. But they do not, and rights 
require rrore independent investigation. 
The chief targets for criticism will be 
certain unduly narrow theories of rights, 
which would have, if they stood, decidedly 
unfavorable environmental consequences. Al-
though Regan's particular view, for which he 
has illegitimately bagged the title "the 
rights view" (as if an animal rights suppor-
ter had to adopt his sort of view), is very 
far fram the worst of these theories, it is 
worth singling out for special attention, 
since it has been heavily prcmoted in envi-
rorunental ethics literature and it does score 
exceedingly well, campared with its usual 
chauvinistic rivals, in certain areas of 
major enviromnental concern, such as the 
(mis-)treat.ment of animals. 
A theory of rights e<nprises a package 
containing the following components: a de-
finition of a right, and further postulates 
(perhaps independently argued for) delimiting 
rights. There is a good deal of slippage 
between these two. But because of the rrore 
ordinary usage controls on philosophical 
theories, only so much in the way of postu-
lates can be pumped into the definitions 
offered. The package also cormnonly includes, 
as well: a set of canonical fonns into which 
all (nondiscarded) rights locutions or cases 
can be put, and perhaps also (with ground 
prepared through these canonical fonns) a set 
of reduction schemes for eliminating rights 
locutions, e.g., by translation, reduction 
rules, etc. 
The particular theory of rights advoca-
ted by Reqan conveniently lends itself to 
separation into these components. It begins 
with a neat definition of right drawn fram 
Mill, according to which a right is, roughly, 
a valid (or sufficient) claim which society 
should guarantee. This is coupled with a 
series of principles or postulates, each 
given sane independent support, of which the 
rrost basic is the right of rroral agents and 
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patients to respectful treatment. Although 
canonical fonns are not explicitly addressed, 
one does emerge, which takes the fonn "'!he 
right of X[s] [not] to -," where "to" intro-
duces an infinitival clause indicating a type 
of action or activity. '!he basic form is 
. singular, applying to individuals, who are 
the only rights-holders on the theory, but it 
permits pluralization (the features included 
distributing back onto individuals). Final-
ly, reduction of rights, in particular to 
sane sort of utilitarian analysis, is strong-
ly resisted. 
While Regan I s rights package will be 
criticized, and in significant respects re-
jected, through its variation a different 
rights theory will emerge. sane of the cru-
cial principles Regan arrives at depend heav-
ily upon--though they do ~ follow fran-t:he 
definition of right(s) he defends. And seve-
ral of the unnecessarily restrictive features 
of the view do flow fran elaboration of this 
definition, in particular the limitation of 
rights to certain individual things, to cer-
tain animals. It is impJrtant then to begin 
with, and hard to avoid, the issue of defini-
tion. 
To ground the variant definition and 
theory of rights to be reached here firmly in 
usage, consider first the main relevant sense 
of right (to) given by the oxford English 
Dictionary, viz., "II.7 Justifiable claims, 
on legal or moral grounds, to have or obtain 
sane thing, or to act in a certain way." The 
account of rights .given by Mill (which Regan 
claims to endorse) contains a similar core: 
"a personls right is a valid claim upon soci-
ety to protect him in the possession of some-
thing society ought to defend. [6] Mill pr0-
vides, however, an impJrtant insurance or 
cover clause, as to who is supposed to cover 
the claim, which the OED account does I not 
include, and which Regan after a brief dis-
cussion also correctly anits. [7] That is, 
right quickly contracts to the less than 
adequate valid claim, but the force of Mill I s 
insurance cover is supposed to follow, pri-
marily in virtue of what is pushed into the 
idea of a claim. As it turns out, it does 
follow, but not in that way. 
Regan, now imitating Feinbergls tricks, 
tries to pull substantive features of rights 
out of the notion of a claim. But the notion 
does not bear the weight they try to impJse 
upon it; a stronger rope is needed for such 
acts than claim can supply. '!he crucial act, 
which tries to read anticipated features of 
the notion of right into that of claim, fails 
at the outset: "To make a claim is to assert 
that saneone is entitled to treatment of a 
certain kind and that the treatment is due or 
owed directly to the individual in question. 
To make a claim thus involves both claims-to 
and claims-against individuals." [8] SUch an 
analysis of making a claim impJrts much that 
the ordinary notion does not support, namely 
in the first place, that it involves or as-
serts entitlement, entitlement to treatment 
of a certain sort, second, that it is a 
transaction between individuals, third, that 
the imputed treatment is owed directly to the 
claimant or is a claim-against given indivi-
duals. But in making such claims as that one 
has visited Mount Athas, has seen the lark 
ascend, took tea at sunset, one is not doing 
any of those things in any straightfoz:waxd 
sense. There is nothing significant due or 
owed. the assertions need not be directed at 
other individuals in the demanding way, or at 
all; and no entitlement to special treatment 
is asked for. Claim is a transitive verb, so 
it requires as well as subjects, claimants, 
objects, claims, propositional items typical-
ly introduced by "that" or "to." Someone who 
makes a claim claims that sanething or to 
(have or have dane) sanething. But that is 
all. O1ly ~ claims are directed against 
others, only ~ claims are entitlements. 
And if it is claims that are entitlements 
that are to be distinguished, it would be 
better to start with entitlements. 
Just such a fresh start will be made, in 
the first stage of modification of the OED 
definitions and integratiOn of it with Mill I s 
definition. Upon separating off legal rights 
(which Regan correctly distinguishes in pret-
ty much the standard way), the following then 
results: Rights are valid entitlements, on 
moral grounds, to sanething (of a correct 
category) • The changes (fran II.7) deserve 
sane justification. First, the phrase "(To) 
have or obtain sanething, or to act in a 
certain way," which gives the characteristic 
fill to "(to) sanething," logically adds 
little content. For each of the sorts of 
entitlement is an entitlement to sanething, 
and conversely an entitlement to sanething 
entails an entitlement to have scmething. 
Second, "justifiable" is not strong enough; a 
claimed entitlement may be regarded as justi-
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fiable if sane sort of justification, which 
as it turns out is not fully adequate, can be 
given, whereas for a right the derivation 
fran moral grounds has to be entirely suffi-
cient, i.e., valid. Third and most impor-
tant, "entitlement" improves upon "claim," 
not merely for the reasons given, that the 
claims involved are in any case entitling 
ones, and that "entitlement" sheds dubious 
claims-against preconceptions, but also be-
cause "claim" unduly and without warrant 
appears to restrict the expected class of 
rights havers or holders, what can have or 
hold rights, to claimants. Of course, the 
haver of a right need not claim it, but it is 
hard to escape the assumption that if sane-
thing has a claim then it should be the sort 
of thing that can (at least potentially?) 
make or stake claims. Thus, use of the term 
"claim" makes it an even tougher uphill 
struggle to work the powerful rights medicine 
on behalf of wild animals and wildernesses. 
Of course too, what claims are made could be 
made indirectly, through representatives, but 
the term "representatives" suggests very 
easily that rights havers have interests to 
be represented. Opportunity to make the 
dubious inference fran "rights" to "inte-
rests" should not be afforded by the basic 
definition, and "entitlement" gives appropri-
ate distance. 
A lot hangs on choice of basic terms 
then, even if it seems to newo:mers, as it 
does to dictionaries, that "right," "entitle-
ment, " and "claim" are more or less inter-
changeable (each is characterized in standard 
dictionaries partly in terms of the others) 
and that definitions like the last one given 
above are virtually tautologous. Well, sat-
isfactory explicative definitions are analy-
tic, but preferably not trivially circular, 
else informativeness is sacrificed. A weak-
ness of the entitlement account is that it 
risks the latter. What is needed in place of 
"entitlement" is something, a putative enti-
tlement, that becanes an entitlement, or 
right, when validity is appropriately estab-
lished, and so on. Fran this angle, "claim" 
is a slightly better expression, since a 
claim sanetimes aIOClunts to "a real or sup-
posed right," i.e., it doesn't write in vali-
dity. To avoid these problems with available 
terminology, there is a case for coining a 
rather imnediate expression to fill in that 
something. (after "valid" in the above defini-
tion) and avoid the disappearance of the 
basic definition into vacuity. A suitable 
term is "titlement:" a titlement is a puta-
tive or alleged entitlement, which may or may 
not be correctly validated. A titlement is a 
transformation of a suitable deontic princi-
pIe, called a sustaining principle. For 
instance, the form "It is mostly permissible 
[for xl to A," where suitable, yields the 
titlement form "There is a titlement [for Xl 
to A." Requirements for suitability, what 
conditions objects (A's) and subjects (X's) 
should satisfy, are investigated in what 
follows. 
Before trying for a further definition 
of right (to), let us return to Mill, as 
interpretM by Regan. Mill "provides guid-
ance" as to how titlements are to be valida-
ted: "the· validity of a right, he believes, 
must depend on its canpliance with moral 
principles whose validity has been indepen-
dently established,"[9l i.e., correct princi-
ples. It is the derivation fran these cor-
rect moral principles that takes up, rerroving 
the slack, the vaguer "moral grounds." With 
this in mind, we can frame our new definition 
of right (to) as follows: Rights are valid 
titlements, fran correct moral principles, to 
sane (categorically appropriate) item. 
NcM, X has a right to A if and only if X 
has a valid titlement, fran correct moral 
principles, to A, scmething that a suitable 
relativized derivation may establish. The 
candidates to fill out A provide a familiar 
list, e.g., freedan fran unnecessary suffer-
ing, respectful treatment, satisfying basic 
needs, life, rewarding work, a fair go, etc. 
By no means all of these candidates can be 
validated without at least considerable qual-
ification, and several restrict the category 
of subjects, i.e., the logical sort of item 
that can have the purported titlement. 
SUch a scheme both enables further fea-
tures of rights to be derived and reveals 
much about rights. In the first place, it 
shows that Mill's important addition to the 
definition of "right" of a requirement that 
society ought to protect holders can be sepa-
rated as a consequence, it is not (as dic-
tionary definitions also indicate) a defining 
feature. For it is no doubt true as regards 
correct moral principles that relevant socie-
ties ought to uphold them. But such factors 
as obligation to uphold, transmit over valid 
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derivations, and therefore apply to tiUe-
ments. A characteristic point of rights, to 
insure protection, is thus a consequential 
feature. Similarly, such diffuse correlative 
duties as societies' obligations to uJ;hold 
rights are not part of the definition of 
rights but a logically emergent feature from 
their derivative character. In particular, 
the Feinberg-Regan claim-against canponent of 
their proposed analysis is not part of the 
meaning of right but sanething that follows 
from the principles sustaining a right to 
sanething. For instance, if it is generally 
pennissible to live free from unnecessary 
suffering, then others, I1Dral agents, are 
thereby prOOibited from causing unnecessary 
suffering1 and the prohibition factor is 
transmitted down the derivation. A claim-
against certain, typically unspecified, I1Dral 
agents is also a consequential feature of 
~MtiU~tsto, transmitted from the 
sustaining I1Dral principle. 
Second, this scheme and definition nake 
it evident that there are no self-evident or 
purely axiaoatic rights: any right that 
stands up, that COlll'llaIlds the tiUe, has a 
valid derivation. And there is always a 
defense of rights by reference to such deri-
vations. It follows, then, that any theory 
that lays claims to self-evident rights or 
axiaoatic rights and any declarations, ccn-
stitutions, or bills of rights that annOWlce 
self-evident rights are mistaken. Rights are 
always derivative fran other parts of an 
ethical system. 
'lhird, the theory shows directly the 
"derivative character" ~f rights and helps to 
indicate the extent of their eliminability. 
For if rights are ever to be established, 
then there ImlSt, in the end, be correct I1Dral 
principles, as there are, fram which tiUe-
ments derive. '!bus, a requirement of ground 
holds, and rights are generated from other 
I1Dral principles, in particular those of 
permission and obligation. Rights are deri-
vative not in the sense that there is a 
precise recipe for translating rights dis-
course out-any adequate translation remains 
within the rights circle of entiUement, 
claims, etc.-but in the derivational sense 
that they derive fran another part of the 
deontic area, that arguments and justifica-
tions for them go back to deontic principles. 
Because of their multiply derivative 
character, rights are dispensible after a 
fashion and at sane cost. So they are not 
absolutely essential for environmental ethi-
cal enterprises. But in a strongly indivi-
dualistic rights-oriented society, such as 
the U.S.A., where rights notions (and partic-
ularly individual property notions) are taken 
very seriously, it is a smart strategy to 
nake heavy use of them, after the!OOde of 
Regan. Environmental positions can do this 
also by deriving appropriate tiUements. 
Rights are not merely derivative, be-
cause, for instance, of the force they are 
accorded and the roles they can play when 
admitted. As American writers stress, rights 
are a:aong the weightiest of m::>ral ccnsidera-
tions, which tnnnp others (hence the impor-
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tance in a It¥:>ral or environmental cause of 
obtaining rights accreditation). Rights cer-
tainly have important protective and insur-
ance roles, in sheltering items fran p::JWerful 
actors and interests. For those sorts of 
persuasive reasons imputed rights are impor-
tant in reinforcing principles, in getting 
others to take items seriously, to treat them 
decently, and so on. '!he social institution-
alization of rights accordingly offers argu-
mentative advantages not to be taken lightly 
or abandoned. For these sorts of reason, 
too, rights are not superfluoUs. Granted 
that for many purposes we can proceed back to 
the principles from which rights derive, it 
is still not a consequence that we can get 
along as well without them, still less that 
there is no advantage or point to them. 
A fourth set of consequences of the 
rights package offered here is that there is 
no basis for various restrictions widely 
imposed upon the having of rights, such as 
interests, sentience, etc. Consider inte-
rests first, since an "interests" restriction 
on rights-havers is pervasive. Nothing in the 
definition and derivation scheme given re-
quires interests (though they could be incor-
porated in suitability requirements). Yet a 
crucial premise in the issue of whether 
things other than persons, animals especial-
ly, can have rights links rights-holding with 
interests. A typical bridge principle is 
that only items which (can) have interests 
have moral rights. This principle is not 
obvious and has had many rivals, notably with 
"interests" replaced by other candidates put 
up for gaining It¥:>ral standing, e.g., ration-
ality, language, sentience, etc.--the same 
tiresane list. 
How then does the interest requirement 
gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an 
astonishing series of bad reasons, including: 
(1) Usage. We don't speak of items lacking 
interests (individuality, etc.) as possessing 
rights. In fact we do, and others have, and 
non-usage has to be backed by other consider-
ations if arbitrariness and prejudice are to 
be avoided. 
(2) Abysmal analyses. A notable example is 
Tooley's analysis of "X has a right to A" as 
roughly synonYIt¥:>Us with "If X desires A, then 
others are under a prima. facie obligation to 
refrain fran actions that would deprive him 
of it." 
(3) Mistaken themes. A notable example is 
Feinberg's contention that "a right is a 
protection of an interest, and hence [it is 
claimed] for scmething to have a right it 
must have an interest." Nothing requires, 
however, that the protection that rights 
characteristically afford is of an interest; 
as far as the meaning of "right" goes, it can 
be of a thing or a system. 
(4) Confusion. Perhaps the It¥:>st notable 
confusion Ihere is that of having a right with 
exercising a right or even with being able to 
claim a right. '!hough these are evidently 
different, and entailments fran having to 
exercising or to claiming evidently fail, 
such conflations are encouraged by easy but 
unwarranted transitions, such as those fran 
having a claim to making or being able to 
make a claim. But, to reiterate, rights have 
nothing highly intimate to do with the making 
of claims by a holder (though no doubt an 
articulate maker of claims holds sane advan-
tage in achieving its and others' claims). A 
creature or item with claims may have no 
ability or oanpetence to make or present 
them, or be the sort of thing that can. 
(5) Contractions. Here the issue is con-
tracting rights to a subclass of rights, such 
as exercisable rights, interest-protecting 
rights, accountable rights, etc. '!hen indeed 
conative requirements do follow (e.g., what 
has an exercisable right llD.lSt presmnably at 
sane stage be suitably alive and capable of 
relevant activity) , but such requirements 
follow fran the subclassification involved, 
not fran the notion of right. For instance, 
the interest-protecting aspect of interest-
protecting rights follows fran the interest-
protecting restriction, not fran the notion 
of rights, which may serve to protect things 
lacking interests (especially tmder chauvin-
istically-favored high redefinitions of "in-
terests"). 
A related cluster of points applies to 
attempts to restrict rights to persons or to 
individuals, attempts also typically tmder-
pinned by the assumption that what has or can 
have rights llD.lSt have interests, or desires, 
or a suitable conative life, or whatever. 
But nothing in the notion of rights restricts 
rights to persons, or to "persons" in a gen-
erous legaJ. sense. Nothing restricts them to 
individuals, or individuals and "persons." 
All these restrictions on right-holders are 
imposed, without much or sufficient justifi-
cation, usually for ideological reasons, such 
as blocking legitimate claims on behalf of 
damaged or disadvantaged items or systems 
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meriting protection. 
Titlements to life and livelihood: 
predatiqn, territoriality, and other 
substantial problems 
Despite the dust that status-quo-sup-
porting philosophers have raised, there is no 
doubt, looking through the cloud, but that 
(a) animals have various interests, many of 
them of the same sort as those of human 
animals, for instance, sustenance, survival, 
sex, and shelter. and (b) animals have vari-
ous rights. For example, they have, in the 
same way that humans do, a right to live free 
fran unnecessary suffering, and fran exces-
sive interference. While these claims are 
substantially independent (having interests 
is logically neither necessary nor sufficient 
for having rights), there are nonetheless 
significant connections, inasmuch as rights 
serve to protect permissible worthwhile inte-
rests which IIOre pcMerful operators, such as 
de-foresters, nay otherwise override or ig-
nore. There is no doubt, furthernore, that 
present human practices systematically in-
fringe animal rights, especially those tied 
to their interests. For example, much animal 
experimentation causes quite unnecessary suf-
fering. Thus, there is a powerful case for 
changing these practices, a case both en-
hanced and easier to obtain positive action 
upon by the due admission of relevant rights. 
Attainment of the sorts of social protection 
the widespread admission of rights can lead 
to should not be underestimated in the way it 
is by utilitarians and anti-noralists. 
Granted animals have rights, sane of 
them on a par with those that humans have, a 
main outstanding question concerns which 
rights animals have. Because especially of 
the widespread phencmenon of predation, es-
sential to the continued livelihood of many 
creatures, the issue can look like an exceed-
ingly difficult one (and one Regan canes to 
grief upon). There are undoubtedly serious 
conflicts of interest induced through the 
phenomenon, SCIOO of them unavoidable, as when 
a herbivore's interest in continued existence 
clashes with a carnivore's interest in con-
tinued sustenance, others avoidable, as in 
human slaughter of whales and dolpuns. Pre-
dation is not, of course, the only source of 
serious conflict of interests; territoriali-
ty, for instance, can also lead to serious 
encounters, particularly in situaticms of 
expanding populations (thus too the issues 
are connected). 
Such natters as predation, territoriali-
ty, and population increase have been conver-
ted into serious problems by mistaken atanis-
tic views of value and associated excessive 
claims as to rights. Removing these defec-
tive themes much reduces the problematic. 
The value theory involved, typified by utili-
tarianism but an integral part of atcmistic 
non-utilitarian positions such as Regan's, 
holds that value (or utility) is a feature, 
at bottcxn, of atcmistic items such as indivi-
duals, that those items (constituting the 
base class) have a fixed (equal) value while 
they persist, which is not substitutable for 
or alienable, and that the (derived) values 
of wholes and organized structures, such as 
ecosystems, is simply an additive function of 
the atoms within it. Characteristically also 
themes of maximization and preservation of 
present. values are incorporated into the 
theory. en such assumptions, predation and 
the like involve a reduction in value, at 
least in the shorter term, and so a subopti-
rral path, infringing maximization and preser-
vation desiderata. The rights view enhances 
the problem by postulating a right to contin-
ued existence to every individual that has 
initial (inherent) value (and similarly IIOral 
considerability positions add to the diffi-
culties) • But the assumptions involved 
should be removed. Both the way the problems 
are generated frcxn the assumptions and the 
reasons for revising the value assumptions 
are explained in detail elsewhere. [10] M:>st 
important. ecosystems, which are IIOre than 
the sum of their individual canponents, 
though they typically include predators, may 
be highly valuable in their own right, with 
lives of herbivores substituted for within 
the system, without reduction of value. The 
escalation of the problem through rights 
theories deserves, however, SCIOO elaboration. 
A serious clash of interests, as between 
carnivores and herbivores, fortunately does 
not thereby induce an incanpatibility of 
rights, unless too many interests are eleva-
ted to rights. But just this appears to 
happen when the extensive (but not invaria-
ble) interests of living creatures in oontin-
uing to exist are sharply upgraded to unqual-
ified rights to life (a mistaken elevation 
that is eamon in ethical thought) • The 
right to life of a succession of gnus is 
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infringed by a lion which also has a right to 
sustenance to sustain its life. With the 
. advance of teclmology it would llCM' be p:lssi-
ble to interfere in sane cases of predation, 
e.g., that of the remaining large carnivores, 
to uIflold gnu "rights" by switching the car-
nivores to an appropriate vegetarian diet 
(and, to avoid culling, our splendid oontra-
ceptive tecimology could be applied to hold 
gnu p:lpulation in check). But to deal with 
all cases of predation and associated issues 
in these bizarre sorts of ways is not only 
practically impossible, such extensive inter-
ference with natural ecosystems is also it-
self at the very least dubiously permissible. 
High-tech vegetarian-style resolutions of 
problems of predation, territoriality, and so 
on, are radically unsatisfactory. On the 
contrary, virtually all remaining natural 
systems containing large carnivores should be 
left substantially intact or restored towards 
their natural states. These ecosystems ought 
to persist and have a right to though their 
flourishing involves regular violation of 
alleged absolute "rights to life." 
Can't rights to life be left intact 
(i.e., merely IWrally extended fran an inau-
thentic htnnan setting) , and the problems 
skirted around? After all, sane conflict and 
inconsistency even of rights, obligations, 
and so on are inevitable and can be logically 
lived with in these latter paraconsistent 
days. Sone can, but not too nuch. Conflict 
should be confined to exceptional (often 
significant) sorts of cases. In these tenus, 
predation is not satisfactorily acccxrm::dated 
by way of conflict of rights or principles. 
It is too regular, systematic, and CWIlOl1-
place. A sufficiently efficient deontic 
system does not nultiply up conflict cases, 
because they rem:>ve part of the p:lint of 
deontic structures; for then nuch too nuch 
t:ime is spent repuzzling and redeciding ra-
ther analogous conflict cases. A IWre satis-
factory fashion to deal with such regular 
systematic conflict, which undennines the 
p:lint and force of principles, is revision of 
principle. Furtherm:>re, a conflict of rights 
approach doesn't feel at all right. A lion 
is not acting wrongly or infringing rights 
wholesale when it kills an antelope or other 
creature. 
A superior alternative, already indica-
ted, consists in winding in excessive title-
ment concessions, so as to avoid extensive 
conflict. A strong and legitimate interest 
in a continuing livelihood does not give an 
unqualified right to life, which can be con-
ferred against associated predators. It 
affords only a defeasible right, which can be 
forfeited or lapse. In these terms, a lion 
that takes a weaker aged gnu, trailing or 
separated fran a herd, does not violate its 
defeasible right to life. The situation with 
htnnans is not essentially different. weak, 
ill-equipped, or reckless htnnanS who put 
themselves in or find themselves in threaten-
ing situations, such as high speed action or 
wilderness travel, take their chances. If 
they thereby lose their lives, their defeasi-
ble right to life are not thereby infringed 
(and where animals are involved, predatory 
animals or animals defending their territor-
ies should not be persecuted). Wild animals 
such as gnus are alm:>st always on wilderness 
travel, except when imprisoned in zoos; they 
properly take their chances with natural 
predators. 
As pursuit of this approach suggests, a 
helpful way of cc:ming to grips with predation 
and like issues is through zoning or !lOre 
generally through bioregionalisrn, which zones 
regions of the earth's surface and elsewhere. 
For what happens, what is protected, what is 
permissible and right in wilderness can be 
significantly different fran that in urban 
areas. A tiger that noves out of a wilder-
ness to a supposedly easier life in a city 
where incautious citizens are plentiful can-
not expect and does not merit the same treat-
ment as it did in the wilderness, namely 
being left largely alone. Moreover, with 
bioregions it is nuch easier to think holis-
tically, to see predation as an integral and 
significant part of a rich natural structure 
--rather than isolated action of individuals 
without a further justifying setting. (The 
adjustment of ethical principles to regions 
and large CCtllIIUI'li.ties need involve no loss of 
universalizabilitYi "wilderness" is an appro-
priately general notion, not yet a proper 
name. ) 
The action of carnivores (including 
traditional peoples) in wilderness areas, in 
taking prey conservatively, in defending their 
territories, and so on, involves in itself no 
infringements of rights then, whether what is 
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taken is human or not (is "replaceable" or 
not) • There is, IlOreover, no need to deny 
that predation with its frequent violence and 
death may involve loss of value as, for in-
stance, if a carnivore had consumed a tres-
passing Darwin early in his career. Only a 
brash utilitarian would insist or pretend 
that when all the undo-able canp1tations are 
done, the suffering and losses and replace-
ments of natural systems, net value of over-
all natural processes is always approximating 
maximality. Q1 the other side, it would be a 
supreme technological optimist who thought 
that human-engineered systems could perfonn 
nearly as satisfactorily, even on a quite 
IlOdest scale. Human efforts, which are espe-
cially prone to breakdown, can saneti.mes make 
sane small i.rrq;lrovements around the edges1 
IlOStly they rely upon exploiting what is 
already there or nearby. As a working rule, 
the IlOre humans interfere with natural pro-
cesses, the IlOre problems there are and the 
more things go wrong. Medical experience 
with intexvention, even in matters as normal-
ly straightforward as human childbirth, pro-
vide well-docurnented evidence of the rule at 
work. The chances of humans improving, tech-
nically or IlOrally, upon Nature in wilderness 
areas is exceedingly slight. To adapt one of 
the ecological "laws" to encapsulate the 
working rule: Nature generally does better 
than humans. Its corollary is: Curtail 
excessive human interference in natural re-
gions. 
It does not matter if, because of preda-
tion and the like, value is not always as 
high as it might be. With the persistence of 
sin and the prevalence of p::>litical wicked-
ness, there is copious reason for conjectur-
ing that we do not inhabit the best of p::>ssi-
ble worlds. Besides, we are free to specu-
late that the long evolutionary process--no 
doubt a rather restricted, heavily interfered 
with, and very hit and miss business-did not 
turn out as perfectly as it might have. Ma-
jor ecosystems certainly do not appear to 
have evolved in a way well adapted to (or 
anticipating, so to say) the arrival of IlO-
dern humans with their enonnous destructive 
capacity and will to power. But, even apart 
fran the advent of such humans, it is far 
fran clear that Nature provides an optimal 
system; rather, Nature "satisizes," i.e., 
si.rrq;lly does with enough rather than maxillliz-
ing subject to constraints (a corollary in an 
Aristotelian adjustment to evolutionary theo-
ry). 
The facts of satisization do not put 
Nature out of step with IlOrality, with deon-
tic principles. For deontic principles also 
answer back eventually to sufficient levels 
of value, not to maximal consequences. Even 
if it were best that value be maximized, 
obligation certainly does not require it. 
Predation can take a rightful place in such a 
satisizing enviromnent, for the natural sys-
tems which have evolved with predation seem 
to offer quite adequate, and often dazzling, 
levels of value. 
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